ABSTRACT: This paper propose a feedback algorithm to estimate the Assets-in-Place beta, which is founded on the existence of risk classes and the linear decomposition of a firm's beta on the betas of its growth options and its Assets-in-Place. We test our model on a sample of US firms over the period 1994-2007. Our results confirm rapid convergence of estimated parameters, and values which are quite consistent with the real option approach predictions. Our model addresses a practical problem which is yet to be resolved and is crucial for valuing firms and capital budgeting decisions.
Introduction
In the area of capital budgeting and corporate valuation, an important problem which as yet remains unresolved is the calculation of the beta of Assets-in-Place (henceforth AiP). According to the real option approach, the market value of a firm reflects both the value of its AiP and the value of its growth options (henceforth GO). AiP value depends on future cash-flows generated from its current corporate resource allocation, while GO value depends on cash-flows generated from future reallocations of current as well as ongoing resources.
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A direct consequence of this framework is that a firm's equity beta must reflect both its AiP systematic risk and its GO risk. When these betas differ, estimating each of these components becomes a major issue. This estimation provides valuable information to predict both stability of a firm's equity beta and future movements based on expected changes in its risk components. Distinguishing between the beta of AiP and GO may also be crucial to the success of a firm's capital budgeting decisions, in that applying the equity beta to value an AiP project might prove as wrong as applying the WACC to value a project with a risk level different to that of its average assets. Myers and Turnbull (1977) soon noticed the potential influence of real options on the systematic risk of stocks, and Jacquier et al. (2001) showed that growth options imply larger beta coefficients than AiP. Chung and Charoenwong (1991) , and Bernardo et al. (2007) empirically found that firms with growth options present higher betas. The problem is that both AiP betas and GO betas are not easily observable as neither AiP and nor GO prices are available to outsiders or many times even to insiders. One possible solution is to approximate covariance between return on AiP and market return by the covariance between return on book value of equity and market return. In other words, one way to approximate AiP beta is to estimate the accounting beta (Andrés et al., 2009) . This approximation entails the practical pitfall that book values are presented quarterly and gathering the usual 60 historical returns to estimate covariances implies delving 15 years back in the company's data. 2 Based on the linear decomposition of a firm's beta in the beta of its AiP and the beta of its GO, we propose a feedback algorithm which consists of using iteratively filtered outputs from the estimation of the equation that links equity betas to AiP betas as inputs in the subsequent estimations. We assume that firms can be classified according to risk classes, each characterized by a different level of risk for AiP and GO. This assumption implies considering AiP and GO risks to be exogenous to the firm, and the beta of a firm's equity to be a function of these risks, and the weight that AiP and GO represent in its total value. We test our estimation proposal on a sample of US companies during the period December 1994 to December 2007. Our results support the consistency of our proposal.
Estimated values for AiP betas vary within the reasonably expected range for these coefficients, are statistically significant, and show non random time path evolution.
Additionally, we find the difference between GO and AiP betas to be positive and statistically significant for the majority of observations during the analysis period, which is coherent with the expected relation between those components of risk.
Analysis of estimations from this iterative model shows that intermediate outputs converge rapidly to a stable value, regardless of the initial input. This result not only supports the steadiness of the procedure, but also provides an idea of the accuracy of simple estimations based on a minimum number of loops. As part of our robustness check, we present results from relating the AiP beta and the weight of GO on market value as obtained from our model, respectively, to the unleveraged beta and a group of commonly used proxies for GO values.
The remainder of the work is structured as follows. The second section derives the linear decomposition of a firm's beta on the beta of its AiP and GO and outlines the main assumptions regarding the nature of the components in this equation. Section 3 describes the feedback algorithm we propose to estimate the beta of AiP. Section 4 describes the sample and variables used in the empirical analysis. Results are presented and analysed in Section 5. The paper closes with a summary of the main conclusions.
Equity beta decomposition and risk classes
According to the real options approach, a company's assets comprise two differing elements: AiP and GO. AiP refers to particular allocations of a firm's resources already made. However, the value of a firm's liabilities comes not only from ownership of cashflows as generated by a given resource allocation but also from ownership of the resources themselves, and hence, from cash-flow as generated by any other alternative allocation. GO are these rights to decide the allocation of resources, which have value to the extent that they impact future cash-flow.
If real options principles are correct, the efficient-market theory predicts that a firm's market value will reflect not only the present value of future cash-flow as generated by its current resource allocation, but also that derived from future resource allocation opportunities.
3 As a consequence, the market value of firm i ( i V ) should be the sum of the market value of its AiP ( i AiP V ) and its GO portfolio (
By direct extrapolation of the valuation Equation (1) Kester (1984) was pioneering in attributing the portion of a firm's capitalisation not explained by AiP to the present value of its GO. See Danbolt et al. (2002) for a critical analysis of the empirical validity of Kester's model, and Alessandri et al. (2007) for a complementary study 4 Note that here we are referring to the beta of the firm as a whole and not to the beta of its equity. To make this difference explicit we will use the term i β to designate firm i 's beta and i E β to refer to the beta of its equity.
can participate respectively. In other words, we divide the systematic risk of both AiP and GO in its exogenous component, By doing this, we are admitting the existence of risk (return) classes, similar to those defined in Modigliani and Miller (1958) for the firm's assets. We thus assume that the whole universe of firms can be classified into a number of risk classes, each of which is characterized by the level of the pair Therefore, Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
or alternatively as:
which implies that a firm's exposure to risk depends on the risk of its current business, the spread between this latter risk and that of its future opportunities, and finally the proportion of the total value corresponding to each type of assets.
In the case of no growth options, the firm's beta equals the beta of AiP. In remaining cases, the effect of the weighted value of the GO on the firm's beta depends on the sign of the spread ( )
It is easy to demonstrate that an option's volatility is greater than the volatility of its underlying asset. This relation might remain the same for systematic risk (Myers and Turnbull, 1977; Chung and Charoenwong, 1991; Berk et al., 2004; Carlson et al., 2004; Bernardo et al., 2007) . Furthermore, systematic risk of the underlying assets of a firm's GO will generally be greater than the systematic risk of a firm's AiP ( i AiP β ) for two reasons. Firstly, because experience in current businesses encourages managers to undertake further risk (in future businesses), and secondly because greater risk in underlying assets is precisely one of the main factors which may explain the existence of GO within a firm's resource portfolio as a consequence of deferring the exercise of the riskiest opportunities.
In summary, our reasoning implies that a firm's beta of its GO is greater than the beta of its AiP, and that the systematic risk of the firm depends positively and linearly on the weighted value of its GO. Analytically, 
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where i E and i D are the value of equity and debt, and T is its effective tax rate.
Assuming the systematic risk of debt to be zero ( 0
) and substituting (6) in (4), we obtain:
Rearranging this equation, we obtain:
an expression that can be rewritten for firms belonging to the same risk class k as:
7 See Fernández (2004) . [ ]
where i e is the disturbance term.
This initial value of 
This value can be used to obtain an initial estimation of the value of GO of firm i
We therefore obtained sufficient elements to estimate the coefficients of Equation (9) from all the firms in risk class k :
The estimated independent coefficient ( [ ] (11), (12) and (13) 
. These values can again be used in Equation (14) and the estimation process can be repeated to
By repeating the process iteratively n times, we reach an estimation of the beta of AiP and GO in each risk class k , whose consistency has to be proven by real data.
Specifically, we empirically test our model to check: i) the stability and convergence speed of the iterative procedure; ii) the significance and sign of estimated parameters in Equation (9); and iii) the consistency of GO weight estimates in relation to common GO proxies.
Sample selection, data and variables
We test our estimation procedure on a sample of US companies between December We apply the feedback algorithm on yearly data from December 1994 to December 2006. Each year our sample includes all firms from this universe satisfying all of the following criteria: (1) having more than 44 monthly stock return data in the preceding five years, (2) providing annual market data for both equity and debt, (3) providing the income statement and balance sheet items necessary to compute our proxy for Free Cash Flow as generated by AiP, and (4) presenting information about its main SIC code.
The sample size ranges from a low of 1,576 in 1994 to a high of 5,205 in 2004. Table 1 shows the annual industry distribution of the sample according to the Fama-French 48-industry classification (Fama and French, 1997) . Most populous sectors are Business Services (group 35) with an average share of 13.1% of the sample, Banking (group 45) with 12.2%, Electronic Equipment (group 37) with 6.2%, Trading (group 48) with 4.7%, Pharmaceutical Products (group 13) with 4.4%, Retail (group 43) with 4.0%, and Wholesale (group 42) with 3.8%, these seven groups accounting for over 48% of the average yearly number of firms in the sample.
[Insert Table 1] Variables are approximated as follows. Equity betas ( 
To approximate Free Cash Flow as generated by AiP ( FCF ), we assume that replacement investments in current assets are equivalent to accounting depreciation.
Thus, we estimate Free Cash Flow by subtracting adjusted taxes from the sum of net income before extraordinary items and preferred dividends, income taxes and interest expense on debt. In turn, adjusted taxes are obtained by multiplying pre-tax income to the quotient of income taxes and the sum of net income and income taxes. We estimate the value of AiP of firm i ( i AiP V ) at date t from Free Cash Flow generated in the year ending at t.
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To deal with such noisy data, we winsorize and remove outliers at several levels.
Winsorizing a variable at level x% consists of setting the smallest and largest x/2% of observations to the next largest or smallest values of this variable respectively. We winsorize at different levels up to 10%, additionally checking our results by removing outliers, proceeding in this case as follows. Firstly, we winsorize all the variables at level x%. We then compute the regression, remove outliers (using y times its standard deviation as the threshold) and compute the regression again. This removal of outliers is "local" at each step, that is, we use the same set of data in each iteration. It is irrelevant whether or not they were outliers in a previous iteration. The combination of winsorizing and outlier removal is the best option we have found to deal with such noisy data as comes from beta estimates. However, our results are in general qualitatively similar, regardless of the filters we apply.
Robustness analysis includes three commonly used proxies for GO values: market to book ratio (MBE), debt to equity ratio (LEV), and price earning ratio (PER). The market to book ratio (MBE) is defined as the quotient of traded market capitalization to the book value of equity. The ratio of debt to equity (LEV) relates the amount of total debt to the value of market capitalization by quotient. Finally, the price earning ratio (PER) is obtained by dividing market capitalization by net income. Logically, the higher 8 Our results are qualitatively similar when we re-estimate the model by using Free Cash Flow as obtained in the year ending at t+1 to determine the value of AiP at date t.
the market to book and price earning ratios, and the lower the debt to equity ratio, the higher the proportion of a firm's value attributable to its GO. [Insert Table 2 ]
Empirical results

AiP and GO beta estimation results
As explained in Section 3, we begin applying our estimation proposal to each of the 48
Fama-French industry classifications in 2007. Table 3 reports estimation results for Equation (9) coefficients as obtained in iteration 6. The first seven columns refer to the winsorized sample at 5%, constructed by setting the smallest and largest 2.5% of observations to the next largest or smallest values respectively. The last seven columns refer to the winsorized sample at 10%. We show the results for only 39 of the 48 FFindustry groups which are those comprising 20 or more observations.
[Insert The t-statistics for the difference between GO and AiP betas are lower than for the AiP beta. Indeed coefficients for this difference are mostly insignificant (28 out of 39 groups in both panels in Table 3 are nearly cero). This difference is positive and statistically significant in just one case in the 5% winsorized sample (group 22) and two cases in the 10% winsorized sample (groups 11 and 22). We also find ten and nine cases respectively in each sample which present a coefficient of AiP beta significantly above the growth option beta.
We analyse in depth this latter counterintuitive evidence by imposing additional controls in our estimation procedure. Table 4 reports estimation results when we winsorize at 5% and 10%, remove outliers using two times the standard deviation as the threshold, and require both AiP and GO to be positive in each iteration.
[Insert Table 4] Under this estimation criterion, we find 20 groups with GO betas not differing significantly from their AiP beta. The first seven columns in Table 4 This finding concerning the positive sign of statistically significant differences between GO and AiP betas supports the coherence of our iterative proposal and the usefulness of including filter controls in each iteration. A similar result appears in the previous 13 years as can be seen from 20 or more observations are shown. The last three rows respectively summarize the number of industries for which this difference is negative, the number for which it is positive, and the frequency of positive differences on industries presenting a statistically significant difference. Over the entire sample period of 1994-2007, we find that the GO beta estimate is higher than the AiP beta estimate in 75% or more of industries. Further, the GO beta is larger than the AiP beta for all industries reporting a statistically significant difference in beta in years 1994, 1995, 1998 and 1999. [Insert Table 5] Additional support for the reliability of beta estimates obtained from our iterative proposal is provided by the evolution of AiP beta estimations during the period 1994-2007. Figure 1 shows these estimates for all industries including 20 or more observations. As in [Insert Figure 1] 
Convergence properties of estimates
The results presented thus far are as obtained in iteration 6. Analysis of intermediate results from the feedback mechanism provides information about its convergence properties. Figure 2 exhibits the sequential results of applying our iterative proposal to the estimation of Equation (9) As explained in Section 3, initial output from the estimation of Equation (9) Movements of the estimates for the difference between GO and AiP betas also tend to concentrate on initial steps. Both the mean value and the standard deviation of output changes in each loop fall noticeably as the loop number increases. Apart from industry 10, most industries provide stable estimates by step 3, this convergence being reached as early as step 2 in some cases.
Robustness analysis
The statistical significance of our estimate of AiP beta may be argued to come from the known relation between equity betas and financial leverage modelled by Hamada (1972) and Galai and Masulis (1976) . Indeed AiP betas as obtained from our estimation
proposal are the coefficients of the variable of
in Equation (9), measuring the weight of debt on the total market value of the firm. This argument cannot, however, account for the positive sign of the coefficient of variable
in Equation (9), interpreted in our model as the difference of GO and AiP betas. Whatever the case, we check whether our results are robust to the influence of financial leverage on equity beta. Specifically, we conduct two different tests. Firstly, we examine the link between our estimates of AiP betas and the slope of the equation linking equity betas to asset betas in the case of zero debt beta:
We run an OLS regression of Equation (16) in each industry k and year t, and compare these coefficients to AiP beta estimates. Secondly, we analyse the link between the weight of GO as estimated from our model results and several proxies for GO that are commonly used in the literature, such as the market to book value of equity (MBE), the ratio of debt to equity (LEV) and the price to earning ratio (PER).
Column 3 reports the OLS slope coefficients of Equation (16) is winsorized at 10% before regressions are performed. As expected, these coefficients all are positive and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis that financial leverage increases equity betas. Column 5 in Table 6 reproduces AiP betas as calculated by the feedback algorithm for the winsorized sample at 10%. We perform the Wald test for each regression to test the null hypothesis that the slope coefficient in Equation (16) is equal to our AiP beta estimate. F-statistic values shown in Column 6 reject the null hypothesis for 72% of cases (24 out of 33 industries comprising over 20 observations), indicating that unlevered beta estimates as obtained from Equation (16) [Insert Table 6 ] Finally, we document the link between a group of common proxies for GO weights, and the value obtained from the AiP beta estimates as calculated by the iterative model. Common proxies for GO are estimated according to definitions in Section 4. A firm's GO weight in its market value (GOR) is defined by the quotient of the difference between the market value of total assets and the value of its AiP, to the market value of total assets. AiP values are obtained from the present value of perpetual current Free Cash Flows discounted at the cost of capital for AiP in each risk class, the latter calculated by CAPM and our AiP beta estimations. Table 7 reports the OLS regression results for different specifications of the relation between the ratio of GO (GOR) and the three GO proxies given by market to book ratio (MBE), debt to equity ratio (LEV), and price to earning ratio (PER):
OLS regressions are conducted for all firms in the sample in 2007 9 with GO and AiP values above zero. Regression results confirm the expected sign of coefficients and are statistically significant for all variables in Equation (17) and model specifications. This evidence indicates that GOR values as obtained by our estimation of AiP betas are related to common GO proxies in the same way as they would be if our estimations were exact measures of GO values. On the one hand, the higher the market to book ratio (MBE) and the price earning ratio (PER), the greater the GO weight in total market value (GOR). On the other hand, the lower the debt to equity ratio (LEV), the higher the GO weight in total market value (GOR). Although R-square values are very low, both overall and individual significance and sign of the regression coefficients offer additional support to the consistency of our estimation proposal.
Conclusions
When valuing firms and their investment we have to cope with the unavoidable difficulty of uncertainty. The only certainty about the future is its uncertainty. In valuation, uncertainty affects the estimation of future cash flows, and must be considered when determining the appropriate discount rate. Finance literature abounds with works addressing this topic, such that for those who are irreverent in corporate finance it may seem that everything is already known. Nothing could be further from the truth. Academics lack a theoretically complete and empirically robust model to estimate the cost of capital, and practitioners resign themselves to using generally accepted rule of thumb practices such as Bloomerg's adjustment of the market model beta.
Apart from other difficulties, our common estimates of the cost of capital fail to consider the well-known impact that a firm's GO have on its value and therefore on its risk. A firm's cost of capital should reflect both the risk of its AiP and that of its GO.
Seeking the appropriate twin share or segment from which to obtain a project's beta may be a biased measure of the risk. We usually worry about unleveraging and leveraging again the twin beta to exploit our knowledge on the effect of debt on risk.
Yet, we misapply most of what we have learnt about the effect of GO on value. This apparent carelessness is probably due to the fact that real options are not directly observable. Moreover, we must admit that we are yet to unearth a generally accepted way to proxy the AiP beta and our practical knowledge on this issue is reduced to the acknowledgment that equity betas should jointly reflect the influence of AiP and GO risks.
Our proposal is founded on the linear decomposition of firms' beta and assumes both the risk of AiP and the risk of GO to be exogenous to the firm. As a consequence, the whole universe of firms can be classified into a number of risk classes, each of which is characterized by a particular combination of these risks. Considering the two risks jointly in each risk class proves little more restrictive than considering each alone.
Furthermore, if current investments (AiP) are the door to future opportunities (GO), then firms investing in the same AiP should share the same GO (and risks), although in different conditions determined by their specific portfolios of resources and capacities.
Based on this premise we are in a position to admit that a firm's beta depends linearly on the weights of AiP and GO in total market value, and thus to pose a iterative model to proxy the AiP and GO betas in each risk class.
With the aim of testing the empirical performance of our proposal we have split a sample of US publicly traded companies into 48 industry groups according to Fama- French's segment classification. This approximation to risk classes has allowed us to obtain results that are coherent with our theoretical inferences. The coefficients which are supposed to proxy the AiP beta and the difference between the GO and AiP betas adopt reasonable and statistically significant values. We have confirmed that these coefficients provide information beyond that offered by unleveraged betas, and allow consistent estimations of GO values.
Whilst proving relatively encouraging, our findings are an initial test that needs to be checked with additional data and methodologies. New findings can only lead to better models for valuing firms and their investments.
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